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Judicial Review of Private Hospital Activities 
The internal activities of both public and private hospitals are 
increasingly the subject of demands for judicial review. Typical 
challenges have come from patients demanding admission1 or certain 
types of treatment2 or from members of the medical profession ap-
plying for staff privileges. 3 Courts look to two general sources of 
law in determining whether they have the authority and duty to 
examine a hospital's actions. First, a court may exert power under 
state law to require that hospital administrators meet a standard of 
fairness and reasonableness. 4 The scope of this review, of course, 
varies from state to state.5 Alternatively, a court may find that a 
hospital's conduct violates the equal protectioa and due process 
clauses of the fourteenth amendment, if requisite state action6 can 
be found. 7 Under either approach, the factor that determines the 
permissibility of judicial review is the existence of a requisite degree 
of governmental or public involvement in the functioning of the 
hospital. This Note will examine the judicial review of hospitals 
under state law and the fourteenth amendment and will suggest that 
unless certain clear requirements for "publicness" are met, judicial 
restraint based on the failure of legislative institutions to mandate 
judicial interference is the better course. 
In the majority of jurisdictions, the ability of a complainant to get 
relief for the alleged misconduct of a hospital depends on whether 
that hospital is deemed private or public. Of course, absent special 
limiting statutory or common-law privileges, all hospitals can be open 
to causes of action for breach of contract, 8 wrongful death9 and vio-
1. See, e.g., Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946). 
2. See, e.g., Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 
1975) (abortion); Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 
1974) (sterilization). 
3. See, e.g., Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1968); 
Natale v. Sisters of Mercy, 243 Iowa 582, 52 N.W.2d 701 (1952); Greisman v. New-
comb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963); State ex rel. Bronaugh v. City of 
Parkersburg, 148 W. Va. 568, 136 S.E.2d 783 (1964); Epstein, Limitations on the 
Scope of Practice of Osteopathic Physicians, 32 Mo. L. REV. 354 (1967); Note, De-
nial of Hospital Staff Privileges: Hearing and Judicial Review, 56 IOWA L. REV. 1351 
(1971 ). 
4. See cases collected at Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 645, 666-67 (1971). 
5. See id. 
6. See text at notes 37-119 infra. 
7. For a discussion of the conflict between state and constitutional standards re-
sulting from a finding of state action, see Note, State Action, State Law and the Pri-
vate Hospital, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1433 (1964). 
8. Some courts have found enforceable contract rights between the physician and 
the hospital based on hospital bylaws. See, e.g., Joseph v. Passaic Hosp. Assn., 26 
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lation of the antitrust laws.10 However, these theories are of little 
practical import in establishing any judicial control over the mana-
gerial decisions of the hospital administrators, despite the harm those 
decisions might cause. The reality is that, in the majority of states, 
administrators of so-called private hospitals have virtually unre-
strained discretion11 while judicial interference generally grounded 
on the theory that state bodies cannot be immune from review by 
the courts is permitted only when the hospital is deemed public.12 
N.J. 557, 141 A.2d 18 (1958) (hearing required by constitution and by-laws); Leider 
v. Beth Israel Hosp., 11 N.Y.2d 205, 182 N.E.2d 393, 227 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1964) (vio-
lation of corporation's bylaws and constitution); Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic 
Hosp. Assn., 395 Pa. 257, 149 A.2d 456 (1959) (bylaws entitled staff members to 
hearing). But see Hoberman v. Lock Haven Hosp., 377 F. Supp. 1178, 1189 (M.D. 
Pa. 1974). Relief under this theory has been limited to physicians expelled from 
a hospital staff as opposed to physicians excluded from a staff on which they have 
never served. See generally Note, Physicians and Hospitals-Exclusion from Staff-
By-laws Rejecting Osteopath from Admission Held Void as Breach of Public Trust, 
18 RUTGERS L. REV. 704 (1964); Note, Expulsion and Exclusion from Hospital 
Practice and Organized Medical Societies, 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 327 (1961); Note, 
Judicially Compelled Admission to Medical Societies: The Falcone Case, 15 HARV, 
L. REv. 1186 (1962). 
9. If an individual relies to his detriment upon a hospital custom of providing 
medical treatment, an action may lie. See Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 
Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961) (a wrongful death action against a hospital for refusal 
to admit a patient). 
10. Although numerous attempts have been made to find private hospitals in vio-
lation of state or federal antitrust laws, no success has yet been achieved. See Pol-
lock v. Methodist Hosp., 392 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. La. 1975) (requirement that staff 
physician purchase malpractice insurance not violation of Sherman Act); Elizabeth 
Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 167 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. Ark.), affd., 269 F.2d 167 (8th 
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959) (operation of hospitals, although a 
form of commercial activity, is nonetheless purely local in character and not within 
scope of the antitrust laws); Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Assn., 58 Cal. 
2d 806, 376 P.2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1962) (California antitrust law does not 
apply to medical profession); Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946) 
(dividing medical staff into four classes was not a combination or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade in violation of Sherman Act). 
In addition, actions of private hospitals that violate state corporation laws create 
possible causes of action in favor of physicians and patients. See Stevens v. Emer-
gency Hosp., 142 Md. 526, 121 A. 475 (1923). 
11. See, e.g., Moore v. Andalusia Hosp., Inc., 284 Ala. 259, 224 So.2d 617 
(1969) (decisions are within sound discretion of managing authorities); West Coast 
Hosp. Assn. v. Hoare, 64 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1953); Natale v. Sisters of Mercy, 243 
Iowa 582, 52 N.W.2d 701 (1952) (doctor's personal life can be considered by hos-
pital officials as violating hospital standards); Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 289 
Ky. 123, 158 S.W.2d 159 (1942) (doctor can be barred from surgery); Levin v. Sinai 
Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946) (no common-law duty to accept as patients 
all who desire admission); Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 
205 N.Y.S. 554 (1924), affd., 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1925) (exclusion or ex-
pulsion may be summary; no charges need be brought, and no explanation, reasoning 
or hearing is necessary); State ex rel. Wolf v. LaCrosse Lutheran Hosp. Assn., 181 
Wis. 33, 193 N.W. 994 (1923) (exclusion or expulsion may be summary). See also 
Comment, Public Control of Private Sectarian Institutions Receiving Public Funds, 
63 MICH. L. REV. 142 (1964); Note, supra note 7; Note, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 704, 
supra note 8; Note, 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 327, supra note 8. 
12. See cases collected at Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 645, 666-67 (1971), 
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Courts assessing a prayer for relief, therefore, must initially 
determine whether the hospital whose decision or action has been 
challenged is a public or private institution. 
Certain characteristics can be identified that indicate the public 
character of a hospital. A public hospital is generally described as 
"an instrumentality of the state, founded and owned by the state in 
the public interest, supported by public funds, and governed by 
managers deriving their authority from the state."13 It is undisputed 
that the actions of a hospital that possesses all of these features can 
be subjected to judicial review. In contrast, a hospital that has the 
power· to manage its own affairs free of governmental control and 
that relies on private funding is clearly deemed private and thereby 
not subject to review by the courts.14 
There is considerable middle ground between these two extremes, 
however, and a hospital will frequently possess characteristics that 
seem to make it both public and private. It is often the case 
that a designation cannot be made merely by looking at selected 
indicators. For example, courts have frequently stated that receipt 
of public funds or governmental regulation of certain activities does 
not necessarily lead to a finding of "publicness."15 Substantial 
governmental control and public financial assistance may thus be 
necessary but not sufficient factors for a holding that judicial review 
is required.16 The current uncertainty as to ascertaining "pub-
licness" may cause considerable hardship; fairness requires that 
courts articulate standards for evaluation so that a hospital has 
13. Note, supra note 7, at 1440. For a discussion of the differing definitions used 
by courts, see Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 645 (1971). 
14. See Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D.D.C. 
1963) (hospital received no public funds other than partial reimbursement for the 
treatment of indigents, and its affairs were managed by a Board of Trustees, no mem-
ber of which was a government employee); Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 21 Conn. Supp. 
55, 144 A.2d 341 (Super. Ct. 1958); Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 497 P.2d 564, 
569 (Hawaii 1972). 
15. See Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961); 
Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946); Van Campen v. Olean 
Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554 (1924), affd., 239 N.Y. 615, 
147 N.E. 219 (1925); Woodard v. Porter Hosp., Inc., 125 Vt. 419, 217 A.2d 37 
(1966); Khoury v. Community Memorial Hosp. Corp., 203 Va. 236, 123 S.E.2d 533 
(1962). 
16. Some courts demand more control than others. See Strauss v. Marlboro 
County Gen. Hosp., 185 S.C. 425, 193 S.E. 65 (1937) (requiring exclusive govern-
mental control). As to public financial assistance, it has been held that a hospital 
does not lose its private status merely by being a public charity, Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 
186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946); Strauss v. Marlboro County Gen. Hosp., 185 S.C. 
425, 193 S.E. 65 (1937), or by operating as a nonprofit corporation, Shulman v. 
Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963); Washingtonian Home 
v. City of Chicago, 157 Ill. 414, 41 N.E. 893 (1895), or by being located in a build-
ing financed through the federal government, Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 
222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963). 
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a reasonable basis for knowing whether its internal activities are 
subject to challenge in the courts. 17 
The confusion has not been diminished by decisions in some juris-
dictions holding that the possession of certain characteristics common 
to a large number of ostensibly private hospitals-nonprofit status, 
tax benefits, public sources of funds, and virtual monopoly status for 
a geographical area-can form the basis of judicial review.18 The 
leading case implying this type of analysis is Greisman v. Newcomb 
Hospital, 10 in which an ·osteopath asked the court to order re-
consideration of his application for admission to the defendant's 
courtesy staff. The court noted that the hospital was the only medi-
cal facility in a metropolitan area with a population of approximately 
100,000.20 Other significant factors considered by the court were 
the nonprofit status of the facility, receipt of large public contri-
butions and foundation grants, and tax-exempt status as a charitable 
institution. 21 After citing these factors, the court held that the 
powers of hospital officjals are to be held in trust "for the benefit 
of the public."22 Management powers were "rightly viewed ... as 
fiduciary powers to be exercised reasonably and for the public 
good."23 
17. For instance, if a hospital claims to be private, it will be governed, at least 
in part, by private managers, individuals who are neither paid nor appointed by the 
state. However, as indicated in the text, other factors such as governmental financial 
aid, tax exemptions or extensive governmental regulation might be sufficient to out-
weigh the significance of privately paid and appointed managers and may result in 
a finding that the hospital is subject to judicial review. For examples of how hos-
pitals with only minor governmental contact and believing themselves to be private 
can find their internal activities subject to judicial review, see Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 
21 Conn. Supp. 55, 144 A.2d 341 (Super. Ct. 1958) (ninety-five per cent of income 
from services rendered); West Coast Hosp. Assn. v. Hoare, 64 So.2d 293 (Fla. 
1953) (only one per cent of hospital's budget contributed by city). 
18. See Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 497 P.2d 564 (Hawaii 1972); Greisman 
v. Newcomb Hosp. 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963); Woodard v. Porter Hosp., 
Inc., 125 Vt. 419, 217 A.2d 37 (1966). 
19. 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963), discussed in Note, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 
104, supra note 8 (pointing out that Newcomb Hospital easily could have been classi-
fied as a private institution with the accompanying exclusionary powers). See also 
Note, supra note 7, at 1440-43. 
20. 40 N.J. at 402, 192 A.2d at 824. 
21. 40 N.J. at 396, 192 A.2d at 821. 
22. 40 N.J. at 403, 192 A.2d at 825. The Greisman court found support for 
its decision in Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Socy., 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 
791 ( 1961), where the court declared the membership requirements of a county 
medical society arbitrary and invalid and ordered the admission of Dr. Falcone to 
full membership. 40 N.J. at 399-402, 192 A.2d at 822-24. But cf. Note, 75 HARV. 
L. REV. 1186, supra note 8, at 1197 ("[T]he power of one hospital to exclude is 
usually not the power to deny all local hospital privileges, as is ordinarily true of 
exclusion by a society. . . . [J]udicial restraints would thus appear less justifiable on 
private hospitals than on medical societies, especially in view of the hospital's direct 
responsibility for care of its patients."). 
23. 40 N.J. at 402, 192 A.2d at 824. See also Sussman v. Overlook Hosp. Assn., 
92 N.J. Super. 163, 174, 222 A.2d 530, 536 (Ch. Div. 1966), affd., 95 N.J. Super. 
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It is not clear from Greisman whether the public aspects of the 
hospital were necessary for a finding of a public trust. This question 
was dealt with in Silver v. Castle Memorial Hospital, 24 which, like 
Greisman, involved an issue of staff privileges. After noting the 
Greisman concept of fiduciary powers, 25 the Silver court pointed out 
that if a hospital's patients were to be of primary concern, and if 
one accepts a fiduciary relationship between a hospital, its staff 
and the public, then the rationale for the distinctions of public, quasi-
public, and private breaks down and decisions must be subject to 
review in all cases.26 While the court's review was based on the large 
amount of public funding received by the hospital and not on its 
broadened view of fiduciary powers,27 its analysis of Greisman argues 
for an end to the consideration of "publicness" in challenges to hospital 
activities, thereby subjecting all hospitals to judicial review. Similarly, 
in Woodard v. Porter Hospital, lnc.,28 the court, not questioning that 
the hospital was private, held that authorities of private hospitals had 
broad discretionary powers, but that their exercise would be subject 
to review by courts of equity.29 It thus seems evident that judicial 
authority exists under common-law analysis in some states to review 
internal activities of hospitals that are clearly private under the tra-
ditional "publicness" test. 30 
418, 231 A.2d 389 (App. Div. 1967) (hospital was private in the sense that it was 
nongovernmental, but public in the sense that it was devoted to the public use); 
Schnier v. Englewood Hosp. Assn., 91 N.J. Super., 527, 221 A.2d 559 (Law Div. 
1966). 
24. 497 P.2d 564 (Hawaii 1972). 
25. 497 P.2d at 569. 
26. 497 P.2d at 570. The Silver court characterized the type of governmental 
involvement with a hospital that existed in Greisman as creating a "quasi-public" hos-
pital. 497 P.2d at 569 (" '[Q]uasi-public' status is achieved if what would otherwise 
be a truly private hospital was constructed with public funds, is presently receiving 
public benefits or has been sufficiently incorporated into a governmental plan for pro-
viding hospital facilities to the public."). While it was not clear in Greisman that 
"quasi-public" status was a necessary condition to the finding of fiduciary responsibil-
ity, the Silver court, as indicated in the text, clearly advocated the view that a fidu-
ciary duty of hospitals to the public exists regardless of "quasi-public" status. See 
497 P.2d at 569: "Hospital officials ... must never lose sight of the fact that the 
hospitals are operated not for private ends but for the benefit of the public, and that 
their existence is for the purpose of faithfully furnishing facilities to the members 
of the medical profession in aid of their service to the public." 
27. 497 P.2d at 570 ("Our opinion ... is limited to those situations where the 
hospitals involved have had more than nominal governmental involvement in the 
form of funding. We leave ... the issue as to whether a truly completely private 
hospital is subject to [judicial] review to future cases .... "). 
28. 125 Vt. 419, 217 A.2d 37 (1966). 
29. 125 Vt. at 423, 217 A.2d at 40. 
30. For additional examples of judicial review of private hospitals under state law, 
see Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp., 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568, 24 Cal. 
Rptr. 640 (1962); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hosp., 281 A.2d 589 (N.H. 
1971); Davidson v. Youngstown Hosp. Assn., 19 Ohio App. 2d 246, 250 N.E.2d 892 
(1969). 
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While it appears that these decisions oppose the traditional and 
still prevailing refusal of courts to review activities of private hospi-
tals, it should be noted that the Greisman court's analysis does not 
necessarily produce the conflict the language of the opinion might 
suggest. Neither Greisman nor the succeeding cases actually in-
volved a hospital without substantial public attributes. The majority 
jurisdictions may in fact look to exactly the same characteristics in 
determining whether a hospital is public, and therefore subject to 
judicial review, or private, and beyond the reach of the courts. The 
difference in mode of analysis may, therefore, be more semantic 
than substantive, with the majority jurisdictions simply more 
restrained in finding the degree of "publicness" necessary to warrant 
judicial review.31 
Nevertheless, the language of Greisman, Silver, Woodward, and 
subsequent cases32 certainly suggests a fiduciary approach regardless 
of the degree of "publicness." Thus, apart from the ownership and 
funding considerations, private hospitals may be thought of as 
"public" in the same sense as common carriers. 33 The issue may 
be little different than that which must be resolved in deciding 
whether there should be judicial review of activities of railroads 
independent of enabling legislation. No doubt, the common law 
often followed this approach, 34 although it is not immune from 
challenge on policy grounds. After all, in the context of the detailed 
regulation of all forms of economic activity by current legislatures,36 
it can be argued persuasively that courts applying state law should 
defer to the more publicly responsive branches and review private 
hospital activities only as part of a clear legislative or administrative 
mandate to do so. 
A related, but distinct, method of challenging internal hospital 
activities is to find that the state action requirements of the four-
teenth amendment have been met in a suit alleging violation of the 
equal protection or due process clauses. 36 This approach requires 
31. No court may ever have to abandon a "publicness" analysis in favor of a 
purely fiduciary analysis in order to hold a private hospital subject to judicial review. 
Characteristics such as tax benefits and public contributions are common to virtually 
all hospitals. Thus, the question left open in Silver, see note 27 supra, of whether 
a completely private hospital is subject to judicial review may be moot. If this as-
sumption is true, then there are only two classes of hospitals: public hospitals the 
internal activities of which are subject to judicial review in all jurisdictions, and quasi-
public hospitals, the internal activities of which are subject to judicial review in the 
minority jurisdictions that have followed the holding of Grcisman. 
32. See cases cited note 30 supra. 
33. See Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 397-400, 192 A.2d 817, 821-
23 (1963). 
34. 40 N.J. at 397, 192 A.2d at 821. 
35. See text at note 66 infra. 
36. The Supreme Court has stated that although the general principle of state ac-
tion can be easily articulated, "the question of whether particular discriminatory con-
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the complaining party to allege an invasion of rights by the state 
rather than by a private party.37 Therefore, the major problem for 
the court in deciding the appropriateness of review is to draw a line 
between governmental acts and private ones.38 
The starting point for much recent state action analysis is Burton 
v. Wilmington Parking Authority,39 in which a restaurant that leased 
space in a parking structure owned by the defendant, an agency of 
the State of Delaware, refused to serve the plaintiff because of his 
race. The plaintiff claimed that the restaurant's action was sufficiently 
duct is state action on the one hand, or merely private conduct on the other, fre-
quently admits of no easy answer." Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 
172 (1972). It has also stated that "readily applicable formulae may not be fash-
ioned." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). See Reit-
man v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967); Kotch v. Pilot Commrs., 330 U.S. 552, 
556 (1947). Compare Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) 
(governmental regulation of utilities industry does not constitute state action), and 
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) 
(governmental regulation of broadcasters not state action so as to require broadcaster 
acceptance of editorial advertising), with Public Utilities Commn. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 
451 (1952) (governmental regulation of a bus company's broadcasting of music in 
buses constitutes state action), and Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947) (judicial 
enforcement of private rights constitutes state action). See generally Black, The Su-
preme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and Califor-
nia's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967); Henkin, Shelly v. Kraemer: Notes 
for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962); Note, Public Utilities-State 
Action and Informal Due Process After Jackson, 53 N.C.L. REV. 817 (1975). 
37. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1970) provides individuals with a civil cause of action for the deprivation of rights 
by every person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom 
or usage of any state or territory. The "under color of law" requirement of section 
1983 has traditionally been treated as the equivalent of the state action requirement 
of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. Nat'!. Bank, 492 
F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1973); Spencer v. Community Hosp., 393 F. Supp. 1072 
(D.C. Ill. 1975). 
38. In so doing, the court should speak in terms of private action as distinct from 
state action, but the analysis typically begins instead with the assertion that the court 
is seeking state involvement in private activity. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). This approach clouds the state action analysis. 
State action and private action are mutually exclusive concepts. If the court deter-
mines that state action is present, denominating the activity as private as well adds 
nothing to the analysis, and is in fact contradictory. The language used by the courts 
must be interpreted to mean that state action exists in what first appears to be private 
activity. 
State action analysis has encompassed a variety of seemingly private activities. 
See Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) 
(a shopping center); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (a park); Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (a private restaurant); Marsh v. 
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (a company town); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 
299 (1941) (primary elections); McQueen v. Drucker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971) 
(a housing project); Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962) (a private golf course); Boman v. Birmingham Transit 
Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960) (buses); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 
F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945) (a library); Smith v. Holiday 
Inns of America, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 1963) (a private motel). 
39. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
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connected with the state to require that the obligations of the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment be met. The 
United States Supreme Court, reversing the Delaware Supreme 
Court, 40 held that under these circumstances exclusion of the 
plaintiff was discriminatory state action. 41 The standard enunciated 
by the court was whether the state, "in any of its manifestations," 
was "to some significant extent" involved in the otherwise private 
conduct. 42 The Court found that only by "sifting facts and weighing 
circumstances", such as public ownership of the building in which the 
restaurant was located, could the "nonobvious involvement of the 
state in private conduct be attributed its true significance."43 This 
method of analysis is used in most subsequent lower court de-
cisions. 44 
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,45 involving very similar discrimi-
nation but a different degree of governmental connection, the Su-
preme Court had little difficulty in concluding that no state action 
was present. The plaintiff, denied service because of his race, 
claimed that the issuance of a liquor license by the state to the Lodge 
was sufficient state involvement to make the equal protection clause 
applicable.46 The Lodge, however, was privately owned and 
40. The Delaware Supreme Court had held that the restaurant was acting "in a 
purely private capacity" under its lease, that its action was not that of the Parking 
Authority and was not, therefore, state action within the contemplation of the prohi-
bition contained in the fourteenth amendment. Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Burton, 
39 Del. Ch. 10, 22, 157 A.2d 894,902 (1960), revd., 365 U.S. 715 (1961 ), 
41. 365 U.S. at 717. 
42. 365 U.S. at 722. Throughout its opinion, the Court referred to state action 
in private activity. As previously indicated, see note 38 supra, state action and pri-
vate action should be considered mutually exclusive concepts. Although directly en-
gaged in by private individuals, the racial discrimination in Burton was state action, 
not because the state participated in the discrimination of private individuals, but be-
cause the state's position as owner and lessor of the restaurant made it justifiable to 
characterize the discrimination as the direct activity of the state, regardless of the 
private interests of the restaurant. See note 43 infra. 
43. 365 U.S. at 722. In Burton, other facts and circumstances that resulted in 
a finding of significant state involvement with the restaurant were the upkeep and 
maintenance provided by the Parking Authority and the mutual benefits the restau-
rant and the Parking Authority conferred upon one another. 365 U.S. at 722-24. 
The Court concluded that the state had "so far insinuated itself into a position of 
interdependence with [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint participant 
in the challenged activity, which on that account, cannot be considered to have been 
so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment." 365 
U.S. at 725. 
44. See, e.g., Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 967 (4th 
Cir. 1963) (en bane), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), discussed in text at notes 
71-89 infra; Ozlu v. Lock Haven Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 285, 287 (M.D. Pa. 1974), 
affd., 511 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1975). 
45. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
46. 407 U.S. at 165. 
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funded, 47 located in a building owned by the membership, 48 and 
did not hold itself out as a public accommodation. 49 The minor 
regulation associated with granting a liquor license in no way gave 
the state an interest in the club's enterprise, 50 and consequently the 
equal protection clause was inapplicable. 51 · 
Moose Lodge seems to have begun a contraction of the scope of 
the state action doctrine, as further evidenced by the Court's recent 
holding in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.52 The claim was 
based on termination of electric service without a notice or hearing. 
The defendant, a public utility,58 was heavily regulated by the 
state. 54 The Court evidently abandoned the sifting and weighing 
analysis used in Burton and Moose Lodge55 and instead inquired 
exclusively into the presence of a nexus between the state and the 
specific challenged action. 56 Regulation was held insufficient to 
47. 407 U.S. at 171. 
48. 407 U.S. at 171, 175. 
49. 407 U.S. at 175 ("In short while [the restaurant in Burton] was a public 
restaurant in a public building, Moose Lodge is a private social club in a private 
building."). 
50. 407 U.S. at 176-77. In contrast, the state in Burton had an interest in the 
success of the restaurant since such success would draw more people downtown to 
use the Authority parking garage. 
51. 407 U.S. at 177. However, because the constitution and bylaws of Moose 
Lodge contained racially discriminatory provisions, the Court did issue a decree en-
joining the enforcement of a state agency regulation, PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR CONTROL 
BOARD, REGULATION SECTION 113.09 (June ed. 1970), that required every club liquor 
licensee to follow its constitution and bylaws. 407 U.S. at 179 (1972). 
52. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
53. For a discussion of the constitutional responsibilities of utilities prior to Jack-
son, see Note, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process in Termination of Utility Serv-
ices for Nonpayment, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1477 (1973). 
54. Most public utilities are subject to extensive governmental regulation. See, 
e.g., Public Utilities Commn. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). 
55. The Court's approach in Jackson, although claiming to rely on the sifting and 
weighing approach of Burton, abandoned the spirit of that approach. Viewing the 
series of contentions put forth by the plaintiff, the Court found "none of them per-
suasive." 419 U.S. at 351. This language suggests that the Court viewed the factors 
separately and did not sift and weigh them in the aggregate. See The Supreme Court, 
1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 49, 148-49 (1975). However, the case does contain 
language suggesting that the Burton approach was not entirely abandoned. In sum-
ming up, the Court stated: "All of petitioner's arguments taken together show 
[no state action]." 419 U.S. at 358. 
Justice Douglas, in any event, discounted this language in his dissent by express-
ing his belief that the Court abandoned Burton through its analysis in Jackson: "It 
is not enough to examine seriatim each of the factors upon which a claimant relies 
and to dismiss each individually as being insufficient to support a finding of state 
action. It is the aggregate that is controlling." 419 U.S. at 360 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting). 
56. 419 U.S. at 350-51 (''The mere fact that a business is subject to state regula-
tion does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of 
the Fourteenth Amendment . • . . [I1he inquiry must be whether there is a suffi-
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provide such a link, 57 and the Court rejected the plaintiff's claim that 
the state specifically authorized and approved Metropolitan's termi-
nation practice. 58 Although the company had filed a general tariff 
including the. termination provisions with the Public Utilities Com-
mission, that agency did not specifically consider the procedures. The 
Court found that initiation of the practice came from the company 
and not the state, 59 and, thus, as in Moose Lodge, 00 it could not be 
said that the state either overtly or covertly encouraged the practice. 61 
The Court also dealt with the fact that Metropolitan had a mo-
nopoly that arguably was granted by the state. 02 Because the 
Pennsylvania statute conferring monopoly status did not impose any 
obligation on the state itself, however, the Court accepted previous 
ciently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity 
so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."). 
It is possible that the nexus analysis owes its origins at the Supreme Court level to 
Moose Lodge, where the Court talked in terms of "overtly or covertly" encouraging 
certain actions. 407 U.S. at 173. 
57. 419 U.S. at 351, 358. 
58. 419 U.S. at 354. 
59. 419 U.S. at 357: 
Approval by a state utility comm1ss1on of such a request from a regulateCI 
utility, where the Commission has not put its own weight on the side of the 
proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the 
utility and approved by the Commission into "state action." At most, the Com-
mission's failure to overturn this practice amounted to no more than a determina-
tion that a Pennsylvania utility was authorized to employ such a practice if it 
so desired. Respondent's exercise of the choice allowed by state law where the 
initiation comes from it and not from the State, does not make its action in doing 
so "state action" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
60. 407 U.S. at 173. 
61. 419 U.S. at 357 n.17. A full discussion of the merits in Jackson is beyond 
the scope of this Note. However, it should be observed that the result reached in 
Jackson remains controversial even under the nexus test articulated by the Court. 
For example, the Court held that no nexus existed between the state and the practice 
of Metropolitan of immediately terminating service upon nonpayment because, among 
other factors, the state had approved the termination practice only in the course of 
approving Metropolitan's general tariff; no hearing was conducted concerning the tar-
iffs termination provision. 419 U.S. at 354-55. However, "[t]o hold that specific, 
rather than routine, approval is required" to create the necessary nexus "would make 
the state action determination tum on the fortuity of whether a practice has been 
challenged at some time in the past and would also imply that to circumvent the ef-
fects of the Jackson decision, plaintiffs need only challenge a given practice before 
the state commission to get a ruling on its validity." The Supreme Court, 1974 
Term, supra note 55, at 145-46 n.53. 
However, Jackson also can be read as holding that state approval of any type, 
absent state initiative or a state order regarding the challenged activity, is insuffi-
cient to transform apparent private activity into state action. 419 U.S. at 357 ("Ap-
proval by a state utility commission of such a request from a regulated utility, where 
the Commission has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by 
ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the utility and approved by 
the Commission into 'state action.'"); see The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, supra note 
55, at 145-47. 
62. Although the Court assumed arguendo the monopoly status of Metropolitan 
Edison, the court doubted whether Pennsylvania had actually granted a monopoly. 
419- U.S. at 351. 
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state court holdings63 that the provision of utility services was not 
a state function or municipal duty.64 Similarly, the plaintiff's claim 
that Metropolitan was serving a state function by conducting a 
business "affected with the public interest" was rejected because of 
the expansive scope that ruling would give to the doctrine, for most 
businesses are affected with some public interest. 65 
In the same view, almost every facet of modern society is subject 
to government involvement through regulation, licensing, financial 
aid, or other control. 66 To avoid the extreme result of finding state 
action in virtually every situation, 67 the state action doctrine must be 
construed as requiring a mm1mum degree of governmental 
involvement-an involvement that might consist of several different 
facets that, in the aggregate, are sufficient to trigger the fourteenth 
amendment. 68 The results of a state action inquiry thus depend 
more on particular factual circumstances than is the case in most 
other types of litigation. 69 Since the Court in / ackson limited the 
63. See Bailey v. Philadelphia, 184 Pa. 594, 39 A. 194 (1898); Girard Life Ins. 
Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 393 (1879). 
64. 419 U.S. at 353. Noticeably absent in the Court's analysis of the monopoly 
factor was any consideration of the implication of Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 117, 
that if a state grants monopoly status to a private entity such that no alternative ex-
ists for access to the service provided by the entity, then the provision of the service 
by the private entity constitutes state action. For the view that a state grant of mo-
nopoly status that eliminates alternatives for access to a service creates a sufficient 
nexus between the state and the service, see The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, supra 
note 55, at 143. 
65. 419 U.S. at 353-54 ("Doctors, optometrists, lawyers, Metropolitan, and Neb-
bia's upstate grocery selling a quart of milk are all in regulated businesses, providing 
arguably essential goods and services, 'affected with a public interest.' We do not 
believe that such a status converts their every action, absent more, into that of the 
State.''). 
The public function strand of the state action doctrine has been severely limited 
since Jackson. See note 70 infra. 
66. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972); Williams, 
The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REV. 347,367 (1963). 
67. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1961) 
("Owing to the very 'largeness' of government, a multitude of relationships might ap-
pear to some to fall within the [Fourteenth] Amendment's embrace.''); Williams, 
supra note 66, at 367 ("it is difficult to conceive of situations where state action is 
not present"). In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972), the 
Court pointed out that since state-furnished services included such necessities of life 
as electricity, water, and police and fire protection, any private entity could be classi-
fied as involved with state action. 
68. See Williams, supra note 66, at 365-69. Otherwise, the pervasive governmen-
tal regulation of society would subordinate all apparently private activity to the de-
mands of the fourteenth amendment, thereby making no sphere of private conduct 
entirely free from judicial review. See generally Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 
F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); Lewis, The Meaning of 
State Action, 60 CoLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1119-20 (1960). 
69. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961); Lewis, supra 
note 68, at 1085. 
Emphasis on particular facts and on questions of degree is equally appropriate 
under two different conceptual approaches to state action. One approach considers 
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broad implications of Burton to the facts of that case, the Court 
seems unlikely to hold that most activities otherwise considered 
private will be held subject to the demands of the fourteenth 
amendment. 70 
a finding of state action to be a necessary condition to judicial review of the alleged 
underlying substantive violation of the fourteenth amendment. This approach fo-
cuses on whether the degree of explicit or implicit state involvement with the com-
plained of activity is sufficient to justify the possibility of legal responsibility undt:r 
the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Under 
this analysis, a court adds up the public characteristics of the activity and the defend-
ant, and if a sufficient degree of "publicness" exists, there is state action and the 
private characteristics are disregarded. See note 42 supra. This approach recognizes 
that public activity and private activity are mutually exclusive concepts, see note 38 
supra, and the Supreme Court has consistently used this approach when addressing 
the state action question. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513-21 (1976); 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
A second approach to the concept of state action reasons from the fact of per-
vasive governmental regulation of and involvement in the private sector. See text 
at note 66 supra. It would assume the legitimacy of judicial review of all but the 
most purely private conduct, whether traditionally thought of as private or public, 
would proceed to balance the interests asserted by the parties in order to come to 
a determination on the merits concerning the alleged violation of the fourteenth 
amendment, and, if a violation were found, would, in conclusory fashion, categorize 
as state action the activity producing the violation. See, e.g., Black, supra note 36; 
Williams, supra note 66. Under this approach, the particular facts of a case are cru-
cial in determining both the degree to which the complaining party's interests have 
been infringed by the conduct of the defendant and the degree to which the defend-
ant's interests would be infringed by a holding favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., 
Wahba v. New York University, 492 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
874 (1974); Williams, supra note 66, at 378. 
It should be noted that under the traditional state-involvement approach to state 
action questions, there may be an implicit balancing of the defendant's interest in 
acting in the complained of manner against the plaintiff's interest in fairer treatment 
at the hands of the defendant. Arguably, this implicit balancing of the parties' inter-
ests has actually played a greater role in Supreme Court decisions than has the ex-
press weighing of public characteristics. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 
419 U.S. 345 (1974) (defendant's interest in termination of utility service upon non-
payment outweighed plaintiff's interest in a hearing before termination, despite ex-
tensive governmental regulation of defendant); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1974) 
(plaintiff's interest in being free from racial discrimination outweighed defendant's 
interest in a private covenant, despite judicial enforcement being the only state in-
volvement with the covenant). 
This Note speaks of state action in the traditional sense of weighing the private 
against the public characteristics of the activity and the defendant. Even though, 
in a particular case, a court may allow its finding of requisite state involvement to 
be affected by its perceptions of the interests of the parties, the analytical focus upon 
state involvement forces courts to draw a sharp, if uneven, line between private and 
public conduct. This line provides more comprehensive protection of private activity 
free from governmental interference than do ad hoc determinations of judicial review-
ability based primarily on a balancing of interests in individual cases. 
70. Another strain of state action analysis that could conceivably subject activities 
traditionally considered private to the demands of the fourteenth amendment is the 
public function approach first recognized in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
In Marsh, the Court held that the business district of a privately owned, or "com-
pany" town, was subject to the constitutional provisions of freedom of press and re-
ligion. The private rights of the owners were disregarded because the town had "all 
the characteristics of any other American town." 326 U.S. at 502. This analysis 
was briefly extended in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 
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The first case to find state action in the context of privately owned 
hospitals was Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital,71 a case 
decided after Burton but before Moose Lodge. Black physicians, 
dentists and patients sued to restrain two hospitals from denying the 
physicians and dentists use of the hospitals' staff facilities and from 
denying patients the right to be treated by their own doctors. The 
plaintiffs also contested the constit~tionality of the separate-but-
equal provision72 of the Hill-Burton Act-the federal government's 
program to assist the states in the construction and modernization 
of public and nonprofit community hospitals. 73 
Involvement in the Hill-Burton program resulted in detailed state 
regulation and financial assistance, 74 which, in the case of one de-
fendant, amounted to receipt of approximately 50 per cent of the cost 
of three construction projects. 75 The court, utilizing the "sifting and 
weighing" test of Burton, found that the defendants' participation in 
the Hill-Burton program provided the "degree of state participation 
and involvement" necessary to impose constitutional requirements 
on hospital action. 76 Simkins stressed the fact that a "massive use 
of public funds" resulted from participation in this case. 77 In virtu-
ally the same breath, moreover, the court emphasized that racial dis-
crimination was involved "in a concern touching health and life 
U.S. 308 (1968), in which the Court held that peaceful picketing of a store in a 
private shopping center was protected by the first amendment because the shopping 
center was "open to the public to the same extent as the commercial center of a nor-
mal town" and, thus, was the functional equivalent of the business district in Marslz. 
391 U.S. at 318. This holding has been overruled by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 
U.S. 551 (1972). Lloyd, denying first amendment protection to picketers in a pri-
vate shopping center, was distinguishable from Logan Valley since the picketing did 
not involve shofping center activities but rather was general antiwar protesting. It 
is now clear, however, that the Court has totally rejected the holding of Logan Val-
ley, see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976), and the public function analy-
sis appears to be limited to the facts of Marslz. Under this state of the law the theory 
has little viability in the context of privately owned hospitals. 
71. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (en bane), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). 
72. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Ch. 958, § 622(f), 60 Stat. 1041, 1043 
(1946). The separate-but-equal provision was left out of the Act when it was gener-
ally amended in 1964. The Hospital and Medical Facilities Amendments of 1964, 
Pub. L. No. 88-443, 78 Stat. 447 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 
2910-l (1970) (amended 1973)). 
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 2910-l (1970) (amended 1973). See generally Rose, 
Hospital Admission of the Poor and the Hill-Burton Act, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 185 
(1969). 
74. 323 F.2d at 964. 
75. See 323 F.2d at 963 n.6. 
76. 323 F.2d at 967. The court also held unconstitutional the separate-but-equal 
provision of the Act. 323 F.2d at 969. 
77. 323 F.2d at 967 ("We deal here with the appropriation of millions of dollars 
of public monies pursuant to comprehensive governmental plans."). 
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itself."78 The case should, therefore, not be read as requiring that 
state action be found in activities of all hospitals that participate in 
the Hill-Burton program. 79 This is particularly true when one re-
calls that in Jackson detailed regulation failed to persuade the Court 
that state action existed. 80 
That the receipt of extensive governmental financial assistance 
may serve as a primary basis for a finding of state action was settled 
in the Fourth Circuit by the time of Simkins. In Kerr v. Enoch Pratt 
Free Library,81 a library established through a private grant became 
increasingly dependent upon state aid, and at the time of trial re-
ceived 99 per cent of its budget from the city of Baltimore, which 
also exercised ~ high degree of control over spending. 82 The city 
also held title to the library property.83 Because of this extensive 
involvement the court found state action present and required the 
defendant to abandon its discriminatory policy regarding admission 
to its training course for library workers. 84 Kerr, however, was 
clearly an extreme case. Only very rarely will a privately owned 
entity both receive monetary aid and relinquish control to the extent 
that a finding of state action could be based solely on the 
precedential authority of Kerr; many cases involving private hospitals 
78. 323 F.2d at 967 ("[W]e emphasize that this is not merely a controversy over 
a sum of money. Viewed from the plaintiff's standpoint it is an effort by a group 
of citizens to escape the consequences of discrimination .... "). 
79. See 323 F.2d at 967 ("Not every subvention by the federal or state govern-
ment automatically involves the beneficiary in 'state action,' and it is not necessary 
or appropriate in this case to undertake a precise delineation of the legal rule as it 
may operate in circumstances not now before the court."). 
However, later Fourth Circuit cases have considered Hill-Burton participation per 
se sufficient for a holding of state action. E.g., Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency 
Hosp. Assn., 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Non-
sectarian Hosp. Assn., 375 F.2d 648 ( 4th Cir. 1967); see text at notes 95-96 infra. 
80. Significantly, one commentator has observed that despite the court's emphasis 
upon the regulatory aspects of participation in Hill-Burton, see 323 F.2d at 964-65, 
the actual governmental involvement with the hospital in Simkins, apart from fund-
ing, was very slight See Comment, supra note 11, at 145-46. It should also be 
noted that the United States, as intervenor for the plaintiffs in Simkins, admitted that 
receipt of governmental funds alone would not be sufficient to support a finding of 
state action. 323 F.2d at 971 (Haynsworth, C.J., dissenting); see Abernathy, Ex-
pansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL 
L.Q. 375, 391 (1958). These considerations, along with Jackson's undercutting of 
regulation alone as significant to the state action inquiry, increase the importance of 
the particular facts in Simkins-massive public funding, see text at notes 81-85 infra, 
and racial discrimination, see text at notes 86-97 infra-to the finding of state action 
in that case and render inconclusive the effect of simple participation in the Hill-
Burton program. 
81. 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945). See also Der-
rington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 9212 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 
(1957). 
82. See 149 F.2d at 216. 
83. 149 F.2d at 216. 
84. 149 F.2d at 219. 
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have failed to find state action despite governmental financial assist-
ance. 85 
A possible rationale for Simkins is the offensiveness of the hospi-
tal's action. 86 Although the Supreme Court has never formally ac-
cepted the notion "that different standards should apply to 
state-action analysis when different constitutional claims are pre-
sented,"87 it has been especially willing to find state action in cases 
involving racial discrimination. 88 Many lower courts have followed 
this practice as a means to prevent a private facade from being used 
to insulate racially discriminatory conduct. 89 The Second Circuit, 
for example, "has long recognized a double 'state action' standard: 
'a less onerous test for cases involving racial discrimination, and a 
more rigorous standard for other claims.' "90 The Fifth Circuit in 
Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital Corporation,91 faced with an 
action to compel a private hospital to perform an abortion, simply 
distinguished Burton as a case involving racial discrimination.92 It 
reasoned that "the interest of the hospital in ordering its internal 
administrative affairs outweighs the interest of the people disadvan-
taged in this case."93 Commentators have also expressed the view 
85. See, e.g,. Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975); Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pac. Medical 
Center, Inc., 507 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 
671 (10th Cir. 1973); Ozlu v. Lock Haven Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. Pa. 1974), 
affd., 511 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1975). 
With something less than the almost complete governmental control that accom-
panied the financial aid in Kerr, the degree to which a regulated private organization 
is dependent for construction or operating budget on governmental aid should be de-
terminative of the outcome. See, e.g., Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 
(2d Cir. 1974). See also note 80 supra. 
86. This rationale assumes the relevance of the underlying complained of conduct 
to the question of state action. See, e.g., Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 
102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974) ("determination of [state] action 
. . . hinges on the weighing of a number of variables, principally the degree of gov-
ernment involvement, the offensiveness of the conduct, and the value of preserving 
a private sector free from the constitutional requirements applicable to government 
institutions"); Williams, supra note 66, at 378 (''The issue of state action is not the 
real issue. The issue must be resolved by a balancing of the right of personal dis-
crimination against the state's compulsory concern for the elimination of discrimina-
tion."). See also note 69 supra. 
87. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 373-74 (1974) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting); see note 69 supra. 
88. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington 1Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
89. See Black, supra note 36, at 95. 
90. Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791, 797 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 506 F.2d 
1395 (2d Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). See Jackson v. The Statler Foundation, 
496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974); Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Socy., 445 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
91. 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 100 (1975). 
92. 513 F.2d at 879. 
93. 513 F.2d at 880. This sounds like a determination on the merits and is 
hardly relevant to the question of whether it is the state or a private entity that is 
acting. See note 69 supra. 
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that different standards are or should be applied in cases of racial 
discrimination. 04 In Fourth Circuit cases after Simkins, the court in-
Abandonment of traditional state action analysis in the abortion context in order 
to avoid a finding of state action, when compared to similar abandonment in the con-
text of racial discrimination in order to find state action, reflects the ad hoc nature 
of judicial review of the private sector when considerations of "publicness" are ig-
nored, Due to the principled nature of constitutional adjudication, see Wechsler, To-
ward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV, L. REV, 1 (1959), the Su-
preme Court should not mold the availability of judicial review around the interests 
of particular groups. This is more appropriately accomplished by legislative bodies, 
For example, in order to prevent a private hospital from being required to perform 
an abortion or sterilization because of a possible finding of state action based on 
participation in the Hill-Burton program, see, e.g., Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp,, 
479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973), Congress enacted the Health Programs Extension Act 
of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-7(a) to -7(b) (Supp. V 1975), The Act prohibits a 
court from using the receipt of Hill-Burton funds as a basis for forcing a hospital 
to allow for such procedures if they are prohibited on the basis of religious beliefs or 
moral conviction. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (Supp. V 1975). See Chrisman v, Sisters of 
St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974); Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 
F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973), affd., 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 
U.S. 948 (1976); Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799 (D. Idaho 
1973), affd., 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally McKernan, Compelling 
Hospitals to Provide Abortion Services, 20 CATH. LAW. 317 (1974); Note, Private 
Hospitals Receiving Hill-Burton Funds Do Not Act Under Color of State Authority in 
Denying Access to Their Facilities for Abortion, 62 GEO. L.J. 1783 (1974), 
94. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 66, at 380; Note, State Action: Theories for 
Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 14 CoLUM. L. REV. 656, 657 
(1974); Comment, supra note 11, at 153. 
The racial-nonracial distinction is not totally without merit since most litigation 
involving racial discrimination relies on the fourteenth amendment, which originally 
was intended to protect the rights of Blacks. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120, 1127 (2d Cir. 
1970). In addition, racial discrimination is recognized by the courts as a particularly 
offensive activity that must be eradicated. See Black, supra note 36, at 69, As 
pointed out in Simkins, racial discrimination is even more offensive in a hospital set-
ting when an individual's health and life may be in jeopardy. See 323 F.2d at 967; 
text at note 78 supra. 
This approach, however, is not without difficulties. The doctrinal basis of state 
action analysis does not allow an explicit balancing of interests, but rather inquires 
on an absolute basis into whether the state is significantly involved in otherwise pri-
vate activity. See notes 38, 69 supra. Under traditional analysis, the nature of the 
activity does not change the nature of the action. 
However, it has been argued that traditional state action analysis should be aban-
doned and the offensiveness of the conduct complained of should be considered in 
determining if state action exists. See notes 69, 86 supra. Under this approach, the 
interests of the private institution should be considered along with the interests of 
the plaintiff. See, e.g., Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir.), cert, 
denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); Note, Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associa-
tions, 16 HARv. L. R.Ev. 983, 990 (1963): 
fl1he court should also give consideration to the weight of any existing social 
interest in permitting the type of conduct of which the plaintiff complains, the 
burden which would be imposed on such an association by judicial intervention 
in similar cases in the future, the burden on courts were they to take cognizance 
of such disputes, and the extent to which intervention might interfere with other 
socially recognized values promoted by such associations. 
Numerous interests of a hospital are affected by judicial interference, Natural 
development could be stifled. See Note, supra note 3, at 1358. Reliance on internal 
procedures to solve hospital problems would be hampered. See Note, Exhaustion of 
Remedies in Private, Voluntary Associations, 65 YALE L.J. 369, 389 (1956), Regu-
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validated racially discriminatory actions by hospitals on the ground 
that receipt of Hill-Burton funds alone was sufficient for a finding 
of state action.05 Then in Sams v. Ohio Valley General Hospital 
Association96 the court found state action in a hospital's bar to staff 
privileges for physicians who had their offices outside the county in 
which the hospital was located. There was, however, no allegation 
of racial discrimination. The court was evidently locked into an 
analysis in which Hill-Burton participation alone was sufficient to 
mandate a finding of state action regardless of other factors. 97 The 
sifting and weighing of the circumstances approach had been aban-
doned in favor of a per se rule designed to facilitate judicial adminis-
tration. 
The Fourth Circuit's post-Simkins decisions cannot withstand 
analysis, whatever the merits of Simkins itself. The basic rule for a 
finding of state action is that the government must be involved "to 
some significant extent" in the affairs of an otherwise private insti-
tution. 98 Any judicial practice that ignores the extreme variations 
in the amount of state involvement in the activities of hospitals 
participating in the Hill-Burton program obviously ignores the "sig-
nificant extent" requirement as well as the sifting and weighing 
method, and can properly be described as arbitrary. Since all states 
have participated in Hill-Burton,99 a rule based solely on that partici-
pation expands the state action doctrine to many hospitals regardless of 
private management and ownership, a result surely intended by neither 
Simkins nor by the Supreme Court in its series of state action cases.100 
lating the quality of medical care could become more difficult if decisions on staff 
privileges were subject to judicial review, for a hospital's regulation of its medical 
staff through the granting of staff privileges is a significant method of regulating the 
quality of care it dispenses. Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301, 309 
(E.D. Pa. 1970). Inability of a hospital to control effectively the quality of its 
medical staff could also cause problems in keeping the cost of insurance down, see 
Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301, 309 (E.D. Pa. 1970), and in proper 
utilization of hospital facilities. See Dyan v. Wood River Township Hosp., 18 Ill. 
App. 2d 263,269, 152 N.E.2d 205, 208 (1958). 
95. Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Assn., 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 
1974); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Assn., 375 F.2d 648, 
651 n.3 (4th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 
577 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Rackley v. Board of Trustees of Orangeburg Regional 
Hosp., 238 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.S.C. 1965). 
96. 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969). 
97. See 413 F.2d at 828. 
98. Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pac. Medical Center, Inc., 507 F.2d 
1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1974); text at notes 39-42 supra. 
99. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF HEALTII, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, HILL-BURTON 
PROGRAM-PROGRESS REPORT, JULY 1, 1947-JUNE 30, 1961, 66-67 (Public Health 
Service Publication No. 880 (1961)). 
100. See generally Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pac. Medical Center, 
Inc., 507 F.2d 1103, 1104-06 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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The real weakness of post-Simkins decisions, however, is that the 
nexus test first articulated by the Supreme Court in Jackson 
clearly requires a search for state involvement in the challenged 
activity.101 Simkins itself can meet the nexus or causal con-
nection102 test because the state was enforcing the separate-but-
equal provisions of Hill-Burton.103 The mere receipt of Hill-Burton 
funds, however, gives no guidance as to whether a nexus exists be-
tween the state involvement and the challenged activity. 
The nexus approach in a nonhospital but somewhat similar setting 
is illustrated by Powe v. Miles. 10~ Students at Alfred University who 
participated in a demonstration during an ROTC parade were sus-
pended when they refused to comply with the dean's order to dis-
band. They brought an action under the Civil Rights Act106 
demanding reinstatement. The court was unimpressed with state 
regulations imposed on the university because that approach "over-
looks the essential point-the state must be involved not simply with 
some activity of the institution . . . but with the activity that caused 
the injury."100 
A number of other circuits have adopted the Powe approach. In 
Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hospital of the Pacific Medical Center, 
Inc., 101 for example, the assets of one hospital had been transferred 
to the defendant, which terminated all staff privileges of physicians 
from the former facility. The plaintiff submitted a request for staff 
privileges at the defendant hospital, but was rejected. The court, 
although purportedly relying on Burton, 108 clearly based its decision 
on the nexus test. Instead of speaking of general involvement in 
the affairs of the hospital, it searched for "a connection between the 
state's involvement and the plaintiff's deprivation" and "a sufficient 
connection between the state and the private activity of which ap-
pellant complains. "109 Because it found no statute or regulation 
authorizing either the state or federal government to participate in 
101. See text at note 56 supra. State involvement in the challenged activity, as 
opposed simply to involvement with the actor, had been the focus of a number of 
courts even prior to Jackson. These courts often stated that they were looking for 
a "causal connection" between the state and the complained of injury. See, e.g., 
Ward v. St Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671, 676 (10th Cir. 1973); Ozlu v. Lock Haven 
Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 285, 288 (M.D. Pa. 1974), affd., 51l F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1975). 
102. See note 101 supra. 
103. See note 72 supra. Other courts have pointed out the nexus or causal con-
nection in Simkins. See, e.g., Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp., 507 F.2d 1103, 1104-
05 (9th Cir. 1974); Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671, 675 (10th Cir. 1973). 
104. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968). 
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); see note 37 supra. 
106. 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968). 
107. 507 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974). 
108. 507 F.2d at 1104. 
109. 507 F.2d at 1105 (emphasis added). 
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decisions on hospital staff privileges, the court held that no state 
action was present.110 A similar result was reached by the Tenth 
Circuit in Ward v. St. Anthony Hospital111 in the context of the 
dismissal of a physician and in numerous other recent cases.112 
It may be, however, that a court need not choose between the 
nexus test and the sifting and weighing test, for there is no apparent 
reason why the two are mutually exclusive rather than complementary 
methods of analysis in the state action context. In clear cases of 
causal connection or nexus, such as Simkins, 113 it is not necessary 
to search further for state action. It would seem entirely proper, 
however, when no nexus is found, for a court then to weigh all the 
circumstances of the case and appropriately hold that the state is 
involved in the otherwise private activity to such a significant extent 
that state action must be found under Burton. It is this "nonobvious 
involvement of the state in [the] private conduct"114 that has been 
overlooked in many recent decisions, including perhaps the Jackson 
decision itself. 115 Totally ignoring the degree of state involvement 
in the general activities of the defendant so long as there is no state 
involvement in the challenged activity itself is no more reasonable 
than the post-Simkins Fourth Circuit analysis that ignored the degree 
of state involvement in all cases in which the hospital participated 
in the Hill-Burton program. Just as the concept of a common-law 
fiduciary relationship between a hospital, its staff and ·the public can 
be pushed beyond reasonable limits116 when all hospitals become sub-
ject to judicial review,117 the state action analysis was distorted when 
the Fourth Circuit went beyond the factual setting of Simkins and 
adopted a rigid "Hill-Burton equals state action" approach. In both 
state and federal courts the desire for an easily applied rule resulted 
in judicial encroachment into areas reserved either to other govern-
mental branches or to private citizens. By confining its activities to 
110. 507 F.2d at 1105. Judge Duniway, in his concurring opinion, relied on 
Powe. 501 F.2d at 1106. See also Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 
363 (D.C. Ore. 1975). 
It is almost certain that the post-Simkins analysis of the Fourth Circuit would 
have resulted in a finding of state action on the facts of Ascherman. There was 
participation in the Hill-Burton program, including the receipt of public funds; addi-
tionally the hospital had tax exemptions under both federal and state law. 
111. 476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973). 
112. E.g., Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973); Hober-
man v. Lock Haven Hosp., 377 F. Supp. 1178, (M.D. Pa. 1974); Slavcoff v. Harris-
burg Polyclinic Hosp., 375 F. Supp. 999 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Ozlu v. Lock Haven 
Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Pa. 1974). 
113. See text at notes 102-03 supra. 
114. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). 
115. See note 64 supra; cf. note 61 supra. 
116. See text at notes 8-34 supra. 
111. See text at notes 18-35 supra. 
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areas clearly mandated by the Constitution or by statute, the judi-
ciary serves its finest traditions. In the state law setting, a thorough 
review of the allegations of "publicness" in hospitals protects any 
possible state interest without improperly sacrificing the rights of 
private citizens and entities. In the federal constitutional framework, 
the two-level analysis combining the nexus test of Jackson with the 
earlier but compatible "nonobvious involvement" test of Burton, as 
applied in the hospital context, avoids the inflexible post-Simkins ap-
proach without sacrificing the wisdom of Simkins itself. This pro-
duces a proper balance of judicial restraint and the judicial obligation 
to insure that legal rights of citizens are adequately protected. 
